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Abstract
Are preferential trade agreements (PTAs) stumbling blocks or building blocks towards
multilateral trade liberalization? We address this question by investigating the effects
of the negotiation and implementation of PTAs on the use of antidumping (AD) (i.e.,
the most common form of contingent trade protection) by member countries against
non-members as there has been a concurrent surge in regionalism and AD activity since
the 1990s. Theoretically-derived empirical predictions are supported by the empirical
analysis based on the 15 most intense users of AD. The results demonstrate that both
the negotiation and the implementation of PTAs lead to fewer AD measures against
non-member countries, except for members of customs-union agreements in force facing
large import surges from non-members. Thus, our results highlight a building-block
effect of PTAs on multilateral trade cooperation when it comes to AD protection.
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1 Introduction
The world has witnessed an astounding proliferation of preferential trade agreements (PTAs)
since the early 1990s. According to the World Trade Organization (WTO), as of April 2019,
the number of notified active PTAs stood at 294, with every WTO member being part of
at least one PTA in force.1 And this figure is in fact likely to increase in the near future as
many WTO members are currently involved in negotiations for new PTAs. The sheer number
of such agreements has generated a large body of literature, started by Bhagwati (1991),
analyzing whether PTAs are “building blocks” or “stumbling blocks” towards multilateral
trade liberalization, which would be the first-best policy.2 A second major trend that has
dominated international commercial policy over the same period is the dramatic increase in
antidumping (AD) activity. Although the stated objective of AD is to eliminate the injurious
effects of dumping (i.e., exporting a product at less than “fair” value), AD activity in practice
has nothing to do with maintaining a fair trading environment. AD “is simply a modern form
of protection” (Blonigen and Prusa, 2003), being nowadays employed on a regular basis by
many developed and developing countries alike.3
Since AD measures can provide governments with a flexible trade policy instrument at
a time when WTO commitments severely constrain the use of most-favored-nation (MFN)
tariffs, it is natural to ask whether the building- or stumbling-block effect of PTAs might
manifest itself (also) through the use of such measures. This natural question has not re-
ceived much attention in the literature up to now, although in his recent survey article on
PTAs, Limão (2016) does point out that the interdependence of PTAs and non-tariff barriers
against non-member countries is an important avenue for future research. This is the objec-
tive of this empirical paper, which aims to shed light on the ramifications of PTAs for their
member countries’ extra-PTA AD activity (i.e., the AD activity of PTA members against
non-members).
A number of theoretical contributions have looked at whether PTAs help or hinder mul-
1See http://rtais.wto.org/UI/charts.aspx.
2See Freund and Ornelas (2010) and Limão (2016) for a survey of the literature on PTAs.
3Economists would agree that AD is justified in the case of predatory dumping, the objective of which is for
a foreign exporter to gain a dominant position in the domestic market by driving out competition. However,
such predatory motives are absent in most AD cases, and in any case, the introduction of AD measures does
not hinge upon their existence.
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tilateral trade liberalization. However, the theoretical literature on this question remains
largely inconclusive as the answer depends on the modeling assumptions. This makes the
empirical investigation of this issue all the more relevant. To guide our empirical strategy
for identifying the relationship between PTAs and AD, we rely on the theoretical work by
Tabakis (2010, 2015). These papers explore the implications of the (symmetric) formation
of, respectively, customs unions (CUs) and free-trade areas (FTAs) for contingent protection.
Both papers employ a dynamic game of trade-policy setting, in which countries are limited to
self-enforcing cooperative multilateral agreements–as is common in the literature–and the
economic environment is characterized by exogenous trade-volume volatility. In terms of AD
measures, which are the focus of our paper, three testable predictions emerge from Tabakis
(2010, 2015): (i) the number of AD measures of members against non-members of an FTA
agreement should decrease both during its negotiation and after its implementation; (ii) the
number of AD measures of members against non-members of a CU agreement should decrease
during its negotiation; and (iii) the number of AD measures of members against non-members
of a CU agreement should increase following its implementation for “high” import volumes
from non-member countries, whereas the reverse should be true for “low” volumes of imports.
To empirically test these predictions, we have built a novel dataset comprising detailed
data for many PTAs. In particular, the testing of our predictions requires information on the
dates of the launch of negotiations for the different PTAs in our sample and of their entry
into force. Using then AD data–and considering also other contingent measures–over the
period 1980—2015 and implementing different econometric strategies, our results do provide
clear support to the aforementioned theoretical predictions. Both the negotiation and the
implementation of PTAs have a significant effect on the extent of AD use by PTA members
against non-member countries. What is more important, PTAs generally have a dampening
effect on their members’ AD activity against the rest of the world, except when members of
an implemented CU agreement face substantial import growth from non-member countries,
exactly as predicted by the theoretical model of Tabakis (2010). In brief, our results suggest
that with one notable exception (namely, CUs in force facing a substantial growth of extra-
CU imports), PTAs are building blocks towards multilateral trade cooperation as far as AD
protection is concerned.
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Our paper contributes to the empirical literature on the ramifications of PTAs for multilat-
eral trade liberalization, focusing on non-tariff barriers to trade. Some studies provide evidence
in support of a building-block effect of PTAs (e.g., Estevadeordal et al., 2008), whereas others
offer evidence showing that PTAs are stumbling blocks towards tariff liberalization at the mul-
tilateral level (e.g., Limão, 2006; Karacaovali and Limão, 2008). The paper by Estevadeordal
et al. (2008), which also makes a distinction between FTAs and CUs, is probably the closest
to ours (at least) as far as results are concerned. Their findings suggest that FTAs produce
a building-block effect, while CUs are characterized by a considerably smaller reduction, if at
all, in members’ MFN tariffs than FTAs, which is very much in line with our findings. Our
work complements these (and other) papers by highlighting that AD (i.e., the most important
non-tariff barrier) constitutes a different channel through which PTAs affect multilateral trade
cooperation. In other words, we demonstrate that in order to get a more thorough picture
regarding the implications of regionalism for the multilateral trading system, other policy
instruments besides MFN tariffs should be taken into consideration.
In relation to the interplay specifically between PTAs and AD use, only four papers (to
the best of our knowledge) examine the empirical effects of PTAs on AD using cross-country
evidence. Ahn and Shin (2011) look at the effect of FTAs on the intra-FTA AD filings of major
AD users over 1995—2009 and find that FTAs negatively affect the number of AD investigations
between FTA partners. Silberberger and Stender (2018) explore the impact of PTAs on the
bilateral use of AD measures over the period 1991—2014 while explicitly considering the degree
of intra-block tariff liberalization. They show that PTAs reduce in general the likelihood of
AD activity between PTA members, but an improvement in the relative tariff treatment
between PTA partners results in a higher likelihood of bilateral AD activity than an equal
improvement between non-integration trade partners. By contrast, Prusa and Teh (2010),
in a paper which is quite close in spirit to ours, investigate the ramifications of PTAs for
both intra-PTA AD filings and AD filings against non-member countries. They find that AD
provisions in PTAs decrease the incidence of intra-PTA AD cases but lead to an increase in the
number of members’ filings against non-member countries. Postponing the discussion on the
discrepancy between the latter result and our findings, it is important to stress at this point
that our paper differs from these previous studies in two major respects. First, we explore
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the impact of PTAs on the use of AD protection not only after their implementation but also
during their negotiation, clearly distinguishing between the two phases. Second, we allow for
differential effects between FTAs and CUs. As the theoretical models by Tabakis (2010, 2015)
suggest and our empirical analysis verifies, making both distinctions is critical in order to get
deeper insights into the ramifications of PTAs for AD protection. Finally, Bown and Tovar
(2016) examine whether the trade integration of Argentina and Brazil within the context of
MERCOSUR over 1990—2001 produced a building-block or a stumbling-block effect, while
taking into consideration both MFN tariffs and contingent protection (AD and safeguards).
They conclude that it is important to consider trade barriers beyond MFN tariffs in order
to properly characterize the relationship between preferential liberalization and liberalization
towards third countries (i.e., non-member countries). They further conclude that there was no
effect during the years MERCOSUR was an FTA, while they provide evidence of a significant
stumbling-block effect once MERCOSUR evolved into a CU (i.e., during 1995—2001). In
comparison with Bown and Tovar (2016), we use a much broader sample of countries and a
longer sample period as well as look at the cooperation effects of PTAs while being negotiated,
aiming to provide a comprehensive picture of the implications of PTAs for the world trading
system.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides a non-technical
presentation of the theoretical framework that can be used to analyze the impact of regionalism
on the employment of contingent protection. Section 3 discusses the empirical predictions that
follow from this framework and how they can be econometrically tested. Section 4 is dedicated
to the description of the data. The empirical results are presented in Section 5, together with
a quantification of their implications for the use of AD and several robustness checks. Section
6 concludes.
2 Theoretical Framework
The main goal of this paper is to empirically examine the impact of PTAs on their members’
extra-PTA AD activity (i.e., the AD activity of PTA members against non-member countries)
and thereby contribute to our understanding of whether PTAs are building blocks or stumbling
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blocks towards multilateral trade liberalization. To this end, we rely on the theoretical work by
Tabakis (2010, 2015) to derive testable predictions. Tabakis (2010) looks at the ramifications
of symmetric CU formation for multilateral trade cooperation, while the companion paper,
Tabakis (2015), focuses on FTAs.
The analysis in both papers rests on three main assumptions. First, as is common in the
literature on trade agreements, countries are limited to self-enforcing multilateral agreements
(i.e., agreements that balance for each country its short-term terms-of-trade gains from de-
fection from the agreed-upon policies against the long-term welfare losses due to its trade
partners’ retaliation).4 Second, countries face every period exogenous trade-volume shocks.
As a result, “special” protection (or contingent protection–the two terms will be used in-
terchangeably below) becomes an indispensable on-equilibrium-path safety valve, facilitating
and preserving multilateral cooperation within a volatile trading environment. More specif-
ically, a trade agreement should allow countries to temporarily raise their cooperative level
of protection–via using special protection–when facing significant import-volume surges so
that their potential one-time gains from defection are sufficiently lowered, safeguarding multi-
lateral trade cooperation.5 Third, as in Bagwell and Staiger (1997a, b), the countries’ trading
relationship passes through three phases: an initial phase, a PTA-negotiations (or transition)
phase during which different PTAs are contemporaneously under negotiation, and a final
phase in which the PTAs in question are in force. This assumption is driven by the realities
of regionalism as the negotiation, signing, ratification, and finally full implementation of a
PTA tends to be a lengthy process.6 In its earlier stages, member and non-member countries
are faced with changes mainly (or only) in terms of expected future trade conditions rather
than current ones, which implies that the relationship between regionalism and multilateral
trade cooperation is non-stationary. Modeling therefore explicitly the PTA-negotiations phase
is essential for a complete analysis of the ramifications of PTAs for the multilateral trading
system over time.
4See Bagwell and Staiger (2002) for an in-depth analysis of enforcement issues within the context of the
GATT/WTO.
5See the seminal work by Bagwell and Staiger (1990) for further elaboration on this result. Bown and
Crowley (2013a) provide empirical evidence in support of this theoretical prediction.
6For the PTAs in force included in our main analysis, about 8 years passed on average between the launch
of their negotiation and their entry into force.
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Tabakis (2010) demonstrates, in the context of a symmetric competing-importers model,
that the parallel initiation of different CU negotiations results in a reduction in multilateral
trade tensions, especially as far as the use of contingent trade instruments is concerned.
Intuitively, this is due to the market-power effect of CU establishment, which stems from
the harmonization of the member countries’ external trade policies. In particular, a CU, in
comparison with any of its individual member states, can affect world prices to a greater
extent (i.e., has more market power) and is, therefore, in a position to punish more severely
any defection from the cooperative path.7 As a result, as countries enter (symmetrically) into
CU negotiations and the establishment of different CUs becomes (more) likely, the expected
discounted cost of a future trade war increases. On the other hand, the mere launch of CU
negotiations has no impact on the existing trade conditions and thereby on countries’ static
incentive to defect from the cooperative path of play. Thus, relative to the pre-CU-negotiations
period, a more liberal multilateral trading environment is now feasible as countries are less
inclined to revert to protectionist strategies, violating multilateral cooperation.
This pro-cooperation effect of CU formation on the multilateral trading system is, how-
ever, temporary. After the conclusion of the negotiations and the entry into force of the CU
agreements, countries’ static incentive to deviate from the cooperative path also intensifies,
leading to the reemergence of a more protectionist trading environment. The reason is that
the CUs are in a better position to manipulate the terms of trade to their advantage rela-
tive to any of their individual member states. An important finding that emerges from the
analysis of Tabakis (2010) is that in comparison with the pre-CU world (i.e., a world where
no prospective CU negotiations are on the horizon), the use of contingent protection in the
post-CU world is, on the one hand, more severe for high volumes of imports, but is, on the
other hand, less frequent overall in the sense that a higher import-volume surge is required to
warrant the employment of contingent trade instruments (on the equilibrium path).
These theoretical results are illustrated in Figure 1, which depicts the most cooperative
symmetric equilibrium of the three-phase CU game. More specifically, bτ c represents the most
cooperative level of protection that a country can sustain vis-à-vis any non-CU trade part-
7For empirical evidence that trade policy formulation is significantly affected by terms-of-trade or market-
power motivations, see Broda et al. (2008) and Bagwell and Staiger (2011).
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ner as a function of the bilateral free-trade import volume, which is subject to exogenous
shocks–for tractability, these are assumed to be the same in any given period across all dif-
ferent importer—exporter country pairs. Notice that e refers to the critical bilateral (free-trade)
import-volume threshold above which the employment of contingent protection becomes nec-
essary in order to safeguard multilateral cooperation. Considering the various phases the
countries’ trading relationship passes through, bτ c1 represents the (most cooperative) equilib-
rium trade-protection function in the pre-CU world, while bτ c2 refers to the corresponding one
during the CU-negotiations phase. As bτ c2 is to the right of and parallel to the original curve,
this implies that above the threshold e1, the same level of imports results in less contingent
protection once countries enter into CU talks. However, once the different CUs are imple-
mented, the bτ c curve shifts to the left and becomes steeper (see bτ c3). Therefore, as compared
with the pre-CU world, less (more) protectionist trade policies are implemented at the multi-
lateral level (i.e., between non-CU trade partners) in the post-CU world for low (high) import
volumes.
In his follow-up paper, Tabakis (2015) explores the implications of FTA agreements for
special protection in the context of a model similar to the aforementioned one (more precisely,
within a symmetric competing-importers model). He shows that the parallel creation of dif-
ferent FTAs results in a gradual but permanent reduction in trade tensions at the multilateral
level, with this effect being more pronounced for special protection such as AD measures
rather than for MFN tariffs. The intuition underlying this finding is straightforward. The
FTA agreements induce trade diversion, lowering the volume of trade between FTA partners
and non-partner countries (while raising intra-block trade). This weakens countries’ static
incentive to defect from the cooperative path of play, enabling them to sustain multilaterally
more cooperative trade policies (i.e., less protectionist ones) once the FTA agreements enter
into force. In fact, a relatively liberal environment can be maintained also during the FTA ne-
gotiations as the prospective emergence of different FTAs with the accompanying reduction in
multilateral trade barriers raises the expected discounted value of future cooperation, without
affecting the short-term terms-of-trade gains from increased protection (as FTA negotiations
have no effect on the existing trade patterns).
The theoretical results regarding FTAs can be illustrated in the same way as the ones for
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CUs. Figure 2 shows such a graphical representation of the results, where the bτ c curves are
analogous to the ones in Figure 1. As in the CU scenario, bτ c2 lies to the right of bτ c1, but bτ c3
is now farther to the right and flatter than both bτ c1 and bτ c2. Thus, there is a gradual but
continuous abatement of protectionism at the multilateral level as countries negotiate and
then implement different FTA agreements.
In sum, the theoretical work by Tabakis (2010, 2015) offers insights into the impact of
PTAs on countries’ ability to multilaterally cooperate within a volatile trading environment
and while being limited to self-enforcing multilateral trade agreements. It is important to
stress here that the predictions generated by the aforementioned models are well in line with
those of a substantial part of the literature on the effect of PTAs on their members’ external
tariff policies. In fact, this is the case even if we restrict attention to papers that do not
share the focus of our theoretical framework on self-enforcing multilateral cooperation.8 In
particular, various such papers have demonstrated that FTA agreements induce–after their
implementation–their member countries to lower their tariffs vis-à-vis non-members (i.e.,
they produce the so-called “tariff complementarity effect,” a term first introduced by Bagwell
and Staiger, 1999). For example, Ornelas (2005) develops an oligopolistic-political-economy
model, in which governments’ preferences are defined as in Grossman and Helpman (1994) and
the lobbying process is modeled as a simple bargaining problem between the domestic industry
and its government. Richardson (1993), instead, employs a multi-sector Ricardo—Viner model,
focusing on a “small” country selecting its tariffs in order to maximize a Stigler—Peltzman
political support function augmented by considering the distribution of tariff revenues, whereas
Bond et al. (2004) present an endowment model with tariffs chosen so as to maximize national
welfare. As far as CU agreements are concerned, a number of papers have shown that CUs
might lead–once formed–to a less liberal multilateral trading environment via inducing their
member countries to raise their tariffs against the rest of the world. And once again, this
result has been derived also in the context of models that do not share the focus of Tabakis
(2010) on self-enforcing multilateral cooperation. For instance, Krugman (1991) looks at
the optimal non-cooperative behavior of symmetric CUs, while Bond and Syropoulos (1996)
8This is important for the purposes of our empirical analysis since one might argue that developing countries,
which are well represented in our sample, cooperate little at the multilateral level as suggested by their
relatively high MFN bound rates.
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extend Krugman’s (1991) analysis by employing a more general version of his model in terms
of its supply structure and by considering also the formation of asymmetric CUs. Last, in a
more recent paper, Ornelas (2007) focuses on CU agreements between small countries that
can affect, though, their own import prices (but not other countries’ import prices).
3 Empirical Predictions and Methodology
The theoretical framework described in the previous section gives rise to a number of testable
predictions regarding the implications of the negotiation and implementation of PTAs for the
use of contingent trade instruments. Among those that qualify as such, AD measures are the
ones that are being used the most extensively around the world as they are relatively easy to
administer, and a case for their introduction is not that difficult to meet the necessary legal
requirements. Countervailing duties (CVDs) as well as China-specific and global safeguards
(SGs) also fall in this category, but they are not used as extensively because of the more
stringent conditions that must be fulfilled for introducing such measures.9 For example, Bown
and Crowley (2016, Table 5) report several statistics related to the shares of various countries’
imports covered by different contingent measures over the period 1995—2013. Their statistics
demonstrate that AD is the favoured instrument, and when CVDs and SGs are used, they
are often applied to the same products also targeted by AD. Moreover, among the countries
included in our econometric analysis, it is only for China, the European Union (EU), Indonesia,
Turkey, and the United States that other instruments besides AD have had a meaningful
impact on trade, but even in these cases, only for some short time periods (see Table 5 and
Figure 10 in Bown and Crowley, 2016). Thus, our analysis and discussion both focus on AD,
but we also consider the use of alternative contingent trade instruments in some specifications.
Focusing, then, on AD measures, the theoretical models by Tabakis (2010, 2015) generate
the following testable predictions:
1. The number of AD measures of members against non-members of an FTA agreement
should decrease both during its negotiation and after its implementation.
9China-specific SGs were allowed to be used until December 2013 under the terms of China’s WTO accession
agreement.
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2. The number of ADmeasures of members against non-members of a CU agreement should
decrease during its negotiation.
3. The number of AD measures of members against non-members of a CU agreement
should decrease (increase) following its implementation for low (high) import volumes
from non-member countries.
In order to assess the validity of these predictions, we proceed in two steps. First, we
examine whether the negotiation and the implementation of PTAs affect the application of
ADmeasures by PTAmembers against non-member countries, without distinguishing between
FTAs and CUs. This serves as a preliminary stage to find out whether there is any prima
facie evidence in the data of the effects that should arise as a result of the establishment of
PTAs. Notice that a lack of evidence on PTA implementation affecting AD use may be due
to the opposite effects that FTA and CU agreements might produce once implemented (as
a function of member countries’ import volume from non-member countries). On the other
hand, the negotiation of PTAs is unambiguously expected to have a negative impact on their
(prospective) members’ extra-PTA AD activity since during the negotiation of either an FTA
or a CU agreement, the negotiating countries should engage in less AD activity against the
rest of the world as compared with the pre-negotiations period. In the second step, the three
predictions are individually tested by allowing for differential effects between FTA and CU
agreements on the employment of AD protection.
In both steps, the dependent variable captures the extent of AD usage by country i against
country j in year t. In our benchmark regressions, we use the count of new AD measures
imposed, but we also experiment with alternative formulations of the dependent variable. In
particular, taking into account that AD measures vary in terms of product scope, we follow
Bown and Crowley (2013b), among others, and use the number of distinct tariff lines targeted
by new AD actions, utilizing the Harmonized System (HS) of tariff nomenclature (at the 6-
digit level of the classification, which is common across countries). However, since the HS
was introduced in 1988, we are forced to drop a few years from the sample period of some
countries (see Table A2 in the Appendix for details on the sample period by country). Taking
instead a broader view of contingent protection, we alternatively use as our dependent variable
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the count of new AD, CVD and China-specific SG measures. We do not consider global
SG measures because such measures, unlike AD, CVD, and China-specific SG measures, are
applied against all trade partners (with the exception, under certain conditions, of developing
countries) and not on a bilateral basis, making them an unsuitable contingent trade instrument
to be employed in the face of bilateral import-volume shocks.10 As the dependent variable
is always a non-negative integer, we employ a negative binomial estimator.11 Using Yi,j,t to
denote the “generic” dependent variable, the basic specification we estimate in the first step
is:
Yi,j,t = β1PTAs negotiationi,k,t + β2PTAs implementedi,k,t
+β3Xi,j,t−s + β4Zi,t−s + β5Wj,t−s + φt + μi + νj + εi,j,t,
(1)
where PTAs negotiationi,k,t and PTAs implementedi,k,t are the regressors of interest. For
most of the analysis (including our benchmark specifications), PTAs negotiationi,k,t is the
count of PTAs that country i is negotiating with any country k 6= j at time t, while PTAs
implementedi,k,t counts the number of implemented PTAs (i.e., PTAs in force) between coun-
tries i and k 6= j in year t (out of those that have entered into force during the sample period).
Notice that the important feature of these variables is that they measure the involvement of
country i in PTAs not including the trade partner j as the focus of our analysis is on the effect
of PTAs on AD use between their members and non-member countries. In terms of other vari-
ables, we control for the level of bilateral imports of country i from country j, their growth,
and the bilateral real exchange rate (all part of Xi,j,t−s), as well as for the GDP growth of im-
porting country i (Zi,t−s) and exporting country j (Wj,t−s), with s in the subscript indicating
the lag of the given regressor. Year fixed effects (φt) are always included, while μi and νj rep-
resent separate importer and exporter fixed effects; in addition, all estimations are replicated
with μi and νj being replaced with country-pair (i.e., dyad) fixed effects. Standard errors are
always clustered at the country-pair level although we discuss alternative possibilities in the
robustness section.
In the second step of the econometric analysis, we distinguish the effects of the negotiation
and the implementation of FTAs from the corresponding effects associated with CU forma-
10In a robustness check, we also use the share of bilateral imports subject to new AD measures as the
dependent variable.
11Compared with a Poisson regression model that assumes that the conditional mean and the conditional
variance of the dependent variable are the same, a negative binomial regression model allows for overdispersion
(i.e., the variance exceeding the mean), which is what we observe in our data.
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tion. Thus, the key regressors are four in those estimations: FTAs negotiationi,k,t, FTAs
implementedi,k,t, CUs negotiationi,k,t, and CUs implementedi,k,t. Furthermore, the speci-
fication must allow for differential effects between FTA and CU agreements following their
implementation as a function of the import volume of member countries from non-members.
Therefore, the implementation regressors need to be interacted with Import growthi,j,t/t−1 to
check whether the data confirm that extra-CU AD activity may actually increase as a result
of the implementation of a successfully negotiated CU agreement and a surge in CU members’
imports from non-member countries.12
The possible effects of the negotiation and implementation of PTAs on their members’
extra-PTA AD activity are identified through different variation in the data, depending on
whether importer and exporter or dyad fixed effects are used. The inclusion of country-pair
fixed effects makes for the most demanding specification as any time-invariant country-pair-
specific heterogeneity is absorbed by the dyad fixed effects, and any significance of the coef-
ficients of interest stems from variation within the country pairs due to the different PTAs
in which the importing countries are involved over time (in terms of negotiation and imple-
mentation). While this provides us with a clean method for identifying the effects of interest
as any unobservable non-time-varying dyad-specific effects are controlled for, the non-linear
nature of the estimator forces us to drop any country pair (i, j) for which it is the case that
not a single AD measure has been introduced by the importing country i against the trade
partner j during the sample period. Some of these country pairs should be dropped from
the estimation because they are such that the imposition of AD measures between the two
countries is highly unlikely (e.g., very small exporting country). However, some other country
pairs may be excluded when the zero for AD measures is a “true” zero: even though there
has been zero AD activity between such a given country pair, AD measures could have cer-
tainly been introduced between the two countries in question. Using separate importer and
exporter fixed effects constitutes an alternative identification strategy, which does not have
12Although there could be, in principle, an endogeneity problem between AD and bilateral imports, it is
important to note that the annual share of bilateral imports subject to new AD measures is very small across
the main AD users (in particular, its median value in our sample, conditional on bilateral imports being
subject to new AD measures, is a mere 0.3%), significantly reducing any concerns regarding endogeneity. Still,
we have experimented with lagging both bilateral imports and their growth by one more year, and the results
are unchanged.
12
this disadvantage (namely, the exclusion of the latter observations). In this case, only import-
ing countries that have used AD at some point during the sample period (against any trade
partner) are included, but this is not a limitation since we do want to restrict the analysis to
active and intense users of AD.
When including dyad fixed effects, these effects are estimated instead of relying on a con-
ditional fixed-effects estimator. In the latter case, the fixed effects are “conditioned out” of
the likelihood function (i.e., a conditional likelihood function is used) and are not estimated.
Thus, such an estimator is not equivalent to what is usually thought of as a fixed-effects es-
timator (as the individual effects are never actually estimated). In fact, in the conditional
fixed-effects negative binomial model, the coefficients of time-invariant variables can be esti-
mated. On the other hand, the inclusion and estimation of the dyad fixed effects may give
rise to inconsistent estimates due to the incidental parameters problem in short panels. How-
ever, Allison and Waterman (2002) demonstrate that the unconditional fixed-effects negative
binomial estimator does not suffer from any incidental parameters bias.13
Before moving to discussing the data and the results, a few remarks are in order. First of all,
the key regressors discussed so far (namely, the ones related to negotiation and implementation
of PTAs by importer i) only take into consideration PTAs affecting at least a minimum share
of country i’s imports. More specifically, for each PTA of which country i is a member, we
look at country i’s share of intra-PTA imports in its total imports in the year before the entry
into force of the agreement, or if not yet in force by the end of our sample period, in the year
before the launch of its negotiation. As a matter of fact, we can reasonably expect that the
mechanisms discussed in Section 2 are at work only for FTAs and CUs affecting a significant
amount of member countries’ trade; for the other PTAs, their trade-diversion and market-
power effects–underlying the strategic effects of their formation–should be very small (or
negligible). Theory is silent on what “significant” actually means in practice. In our main
regressions, we assume this import-share threshold to be 10%, but we discuss the sensitivity
of our results to the chosen threshold in the robustness section.
A different way to capture the extent of country’s i involvement in PTAs is to measure
the shares of its imports affected by the negotiation and the implementation of PTAs. In
13In addition, for some country pairs, our sample covers a period of 36 years (see Table A2 in the Appendix).
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this case, we do not have to choose a threshold, but different complications arise. On a
methodological front, we may be concerned that these shares are endogenous to the use of
AD. On a practical front, it is important to point out that we treat the EU as a “country” as
its member states have delegated trade policy authority to the EU. However, the composition
of the EU has been changing over time due to its various enlargements, which poses significant
problems in its case for such trade-share calculations. To address both issues and verify the
robustness of our results to the use of continuous “threshold-free” PTA regressors, we calculate
the aforementioned shares based on the trade flows in 1980 (i.e., the first year of our sample
period), holding constant the membership of the EU also as of 1980.14 This solution, though,
comes with the caveat that the world has experienced a dramatic change in trade patterns since
then, which explains why we do not use this version of the PTA regressors in the benchmark
regressions.
In terms of the sample, we do not include country pairs that are partners to the same PTA
in force or are jointly involved in the negotiation of one. The reason is that our focus is on
studying whether PTAs have an effect on the use of AD measures by their members against
non-member countries while being negotiated and after entering into force. Our empirical
analysis thereby focuses on a comparison of AD patterns between members of PTAs and
non-members before versus after the negotiation and the implementation of the PTAs in
question, not on a comparison of AD patterns within PTAs vis-à-vis AD patterns between
PTA members and non-member countries (although we revisit this choice in the section on
robustness checks).15
4 Data
In order to implement the econometric strategy discussed in the previous section, three sets
of data are needed. Detailed information on the history of formation of PTAs is essential for
our analysis, with this dataset having proved to be the most difficult to build. Data on the
14We still restrict our attention to PTAs affecting at least 1% of country i’s imports.
15We exclude any pair of countries that are members of the same PTA in force as recorded by de Sousa
(2012). In the case of a country pair (i, j) negotiating a PTA, we exclude it if the share of imports of country
i affected by the trade agreement is at least 1%.
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use of AD and other contingent instruments are required to construct the dependent variable
in its various forms, while the final dataset comprises data on trade and macro variables. In
what follows, we discuss each of these datasets in turn.
Regarding PTAs, our full sample consists of all agreements notified or announced early to
the GATT/WTO, satisfying all of the following three conditions: (i) they entered into force
during 1980—2015 (i.e., during our sample period) and were still active by the end of 2015, or
they were not yet in force by the end of 2015, but an early announcement of them has been
made to the WTO; (ii) they involve at least one of the 15 most intense users of AD (to be
specified below); and (iii) for at least one of their members belonging to the aforementioned
set of 15 countries, the share of intra-PTA imports in its total imports was at least 1% in
the year before their entry into force, or for PTAs not yet in force by the end of 2015, in
the year before the launch of their negotiation. For these PTAs, we undertook extensive data
collection since no single source (e.g., Dür et al., 2014) provides complete details on the history
of formation of the existing PTAs. In particular, for each PTA in our sample, we gathered
detailed information with respect to its entire history–namely, we gathered the dates of (i)
the initiation of the PTA formation process (e.g., the launch of a joint feasibility study); (ii)
the launch of negotiations; (iii) the start of the first round of formal negotiations; (iv) the
formal conclusion of negotiations; (v) the signature of the agreement; (vi) the ratification
of the agreement; and (vii) the entry into force of the agreement. However, in line with the
timing of the strategic effects produced by PTA formation within the context of our theoretical
framework, the empirical analysis utilizes two of these dates for each PTA: the date of the
launch of negotiations and the date of its entry into force.16 The information comes from a wide
range of online sources, including (but not limited to) the WTO, the European Commission,
the European Parliament, the Office of the United States Trade Representative, the Foreign
Trade Information System (SICE) of the Organization of American States, the Asia Regional
Integration Center of the Asian Development Bank, partner countries’ official sources (e.g.,
the Ministry of Commerce of China), or national legislative bodies (for ratification dates). As
16In some cases (e.g., the EU—South Africa Trade, Development and Cooperation Agreement), an agreement
is provisionally applied before it fully enters into force. For these agreements, we use in our empirical analysis
the date of provisional application rather than the date of entry into force as the provisional application of a
PTA already has important ramifications for the trading relationship between its members and non-member
countries (e.g., in terms of trade diversion).
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a last resort, we also used historical data from quality newspapers.
Using 10% as the import-share threshold in condition (iii) above in order to choose which
PTAs to include in our main analysis, we end up with 24 PTAs for the construction of our
key regressors related to negotiation and implementation of PTAs by importer i (see Table
A1 in the Appendix for the full list). Out of these 24 PTAs, five are classified as still under
negotiation based on their status at the end of 2015, while only four are CUs.17 It is important
to note here that one given PTA may be counted for more than one of the importing countries
included in the analysis depending on each member’s share of intra-PTA imports in its total
imports. For example, NAFTA is counted for all three member countries–Canada, Mexico,
and the United States–but the CU between the EU and Turkey is counted only for Turkey
due to EU imports from Turkey in 1995 (i.e., the year before the entry into force of the
agreement) representing less than 10% of the EU’s total imports. Moreover, it should be
stressed here that there are few CUs in the sample which, if anything, may make it harder to
find support for our theoretical predictions regarding CUs.
The data on AD usage (since 1980) come mainly from the Global Antidumping Database
(Bown, 2016a) and are complemented with information from Moore and Zanardi (2009) for
some countries and years.18 In particular, these sources allow us to construct the dependent
variable as the count of AD measures introduced by an importer i against an exporter j in
year t. The database in question also includes details about the HS lines targeted by each
AD measure, which we use in constructing two of our alternative dependent variables: the
number of HS lines targeted by new AD measures and the share of bilateral imports subject
to new AD measures. Since we would expect the PTA effects on the use of AD to occur
only for those countries that do make systematic use of this form of contingent protection,
we limit the sample of importing countries to those using intensely this policy instrument.
Table 1 provides summary statistics on the worldwide use of AD (in terms of both initiations
and measures) over our sample period, which runs from 1980 until 2015, with a later starting
year for importing countries that have implemented an AD law more recently (see Table A2
17We should note that we treat MERCOSUR as a CU under negotiation during 1988—1994, as an imple-
mented FTA during 1991—1994, and as an implemented CU from 1995 onwards.
18For the sample used in the econometric analysis, only the data for Canada before 1985, the EU before
1987, and New Zealand before 1995 are taken from Moore and Zanardi (2009).
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in the Appendix for details on included years by country). In order to select which countries
to include in our sample of importers, we consider the cumulative number and annual average
of AD investigations and applied measures (e.g., AD duties, price undertakings) by country.19
The summary statistics reported in Table 1 corroborate previous findings in the literature in
terms of the countries that are the most intense users of this instrument. Based on the table,
we include in our sample of importing countries the five traditional users of AD (consisting
of Australia, Canada, the EU, New Zealand, and the United States) and the ten most active
new users: Argentina, Brazil, China, India, Indonesia, Mexico, Peru, South Africa, South
Korea, and Turkey. We choose to include New Zealand among them because, although its
numbers of initiations and measures per year over our entire sample period are not very
large, it was a heavy AD user in the 1980s (a period which is included in our analysis);
and in a robustness check, we drop it.20 Furthermore, the data on CVDs and China-specific
SG measures come from the Global Countervailing Duties Database (Bown, 2016b) and the
China-Specific Safeguards Database (Bown, 2016c), respectively.
As for the import data (at the aggregate bilateral level), they are taken from IMF’s Direc-
tion of Trade Statistics, and they serve two purposes. First, we need to control for the size of
imports from a given trade partner and their growth as they are both known determinants of
AD measures against the country in question. Not less importantly, one of the empirical pre-
dictions emerging from Tabakis (2010) is that the effect of CU agreements, once implemented,
on the AD usage of their members against non-member countries depends on the members’
import volume from the latter. Hence, interacting import growth (between t and t− 1) with
the PTA implementation variables is key in distinguishing the impact of FTAs from CUs on
their members’ extra-PTA AD activity. Moreover, as one robustness check requires the use of
bilateral trade values at the 6-digit HS level, we also extract data from UN Comtrade.
Macro controls comprising the (log of the) bilateral real exchange rate (with a 1-year lag)
and importer and exporter GDP growth rates (between t and t − 3) are also included as
19Initiations and measures per year are based on the number of years for which a country has had an AD
law in force during the sample period 1980—2015.
20We do not include Taiwan in our sample of importers, even though it has initiated quite a few investiga-
tions, because of its very low success rate for the introduction of AD measures (more specifically, 23.4% versus
56.1% for the entire set of AD users and 57.1% for the chosen 15 importers), which we use as our dependent
variable in the benchmark regressions (and in most of our analysis).
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they have been shown to affect the introduction of AD measures (e.g., see the seminal work
by Knetter and Prusa, 2003). In fact, the lag structure we employ for the macro controls
is identical to the one of Knetter and Prusa (2003). Our GDP data are taken from the
World Development Indicators (WDI), while the data on the bilateral real exchange rate
come from the Economic Research Service of the United States Department of Agriculture.
Finally, in one robustness check, we need data for each of our importers on the ideological
orientation of its government and its capital—labor ratio. The former come from the Database
of Political Institutions (Cruz et al., 2018), with the ideology variable taking a value of 1, 2,
or 3 depending on whether the government is right-wing, centrist, or left-wing, respectively.21
The data on capital are taken from the Penn World Table, while the data on labor (defined
as the population aged 15 to 64) come from WDI.
Merging these sets of data, the sample consists of 15 importing countries and all of their
trade partners as exporters over the period 1980—2015. Nevertheless, starting from the consid-
eration of all possible trade partners of the 15 importing countries specified above, import and
macro data are missing in many cases, and therefore, the inclusion of the associated regressors
forces us to drop many observations. For the observations included in the benchmark regres-
sions, the summary statistics of our variables are reported in the top panel of Table 2, while
the bottom panel reports statistics for the alternative dependent variables and PTA regressors
employed in our analysis. It is clear that AD measures are not very common even though they
are very important policywise (and the average count of new AD measures imposed doubles in
the sample used in the regressions with dyad fixed effects, consisting of country pairs with at
least one introduced AD measure). The same holds true when considering the number of HS
lines subject to AD or the total count of AD, CVD, and China-specific SG measures. In terms
of the regressors of interest, the maximum number of either simultaneous PTA negotiations or
simultaneous PTA implementations is 5, which is reached in both cases by Indonesia because
it is part of the agreements involving ASEAN (see Table A1). Moreover, the summary sta-
tistics of our FTA and CU regressors clearly illustrate that there are few CUs in our sample
21Following Dutt and Mitra (2005), we use the ideological orientation of the chief executive for presidential
systems, that of the largest governing party for parliamentary systems, and their average for political systems
with an assembly-elected president. We should further note that data are missing for Indonesia (for the entirety
of our sample period) and Turkey (for 2003—2015), and that we assign a value of 2 to the EU throughout.
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(especially under negotiation in any given year), which could make it difficult to find support
in the data for the theoretical results regarding CUs discussed in Section 2.
5 Empirical Results
The results of the first step of our econometric analysis are presented in Table 3. In this
case, we do not distinguish between FTAs and CUs in their effects on the use of AD by
their members against the rest of the world. Still, it should be the case that higher values
of PTAs negotiationi,k,t lead to fewer extra-PTA AD measures (as the effects of FTA and
CU agreements during their negotiation should be qualitatively the same according to our
theoretical framework). In addition, the estimated coefficient of PTAs implementedi,k,t should
also be negative, except if the effect from members of CUs facing high import growth from
non-member countries dominates.
Table 3 contains eight specifications that differ in terms of the dependent variable, the
PTA regressors, and/or the set of included fixed effects. The first two columns present our
benchmark results, with the dependent variable being the count of new ADmeasures imposed.
In column (1), we include separate importer and exporter fixed effects, which we replace in
column (2) with country-pair fixed effects, a pattern that we henceforth follow in all of our
estimations. In columns (3)—(8), we explore the robustness of our benchmark results to alter-
native formulations of the dependent variable and of the PTA regressors. More specifically, the
dependent variable is the total number of 6-digit HS tariff lines subject to new AD measures
in columns (3)—(4), while it is the count of newly introduced AD, CVD, and China-specific SG
measures in columns (5)—(6); on the other hand, in columns (7)—(8), we retain our benchmark
dependent variable but use as main regressors the shares of imports affected by the negotiation
and the implementation of PTAs. Before delving into the specifics of these estimations, it is
obvious that the results are very robust: across specifications, we find that the negotiation
and the implementation of PTAs between an importing country i and any country k 6= j in
year t both reduce the AD activity of country i against trade partner j in the same year. The
corresponding coefficients are always statically significant (at least at the 5% level), with the
estimated coefficient of PTAs implementedi,k,t being larger (in absolute value) than the one
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of PTAs negotiationi,k,t in all regressions. Thus, it is the case that the data provide support
to the theoretical predictions discussed in Section 2.22 In graphical terms, the negative coef-
ficient of PTAs negotiationi,k,t represents the downward shift in the bτ c curve between phases
1 and 2 in both Figures 1 and 2 since as either FTA or CU negotiations are launched around
the globe, countries’ expected value of future multilateral trade cooperation increases, while
their static incentive to defect from the cooperative path of play remains unaffected. As for
the coefficient of PTAs implementedi,k,t, Figures 1 and 2 highlight an important difference
between FTA and CU agreements following their implementation that we will address in Table
4.
Looking in detail at Table 3, notice that the inclusion of dyad fixed effects leads to a
significant loss of observations (more precisely, any country pair (i, j) for which it is the
case that the dependent variable equals to zero throughout the sample period is dropped).
Still, there is no change in the qualitative results when employing this much more demanding
identification strategy: given a definition of the dependent variable and of the PTA regressors,
there are no statistically significant differences in the estimates of the coefficients of the main
regressors between the two specifications with the different sets of fixed effects (except in the
case of PTAs implementedi,k,t in columns (3) and (4)). The number of observations is the
smallest when the dependent variable is the number of targeted HS lines because, as discussed
above, the HS was introduced only in 1988, forcing us to drop a few years from the sample
period of some of our importers. Instead, when the dependent variable is the count of newly
introduced AD, CVD, and China-specific SG measures, there is an increase in the number of
observations relative to the benchmark regressions in columns (1)—(2). The reason is that some
exporters and importer—exporter pairs are now retained (in columns (5) and (6), respectively)
because, even though the given exporters never faced any AD measure over our sample period
from, respectively, any of our importers or the specific importer in the pair, the same does
not hold when taking into consideration other instruments of contingent protection. More
importantly, the estimated coefficients of PTAs negotiationi,k,t and PTAs implementedi,k,t
would not be statistically different if the trade and macro controls were omitted, except in
22Obviously, it is possible to “merge” two of the approaches discussed above and use the count of HS lines
subject to new AD, CVD, and China-specific SG measures as the dependent variable. The qualitative results
when using this dependent variable are unchanged.
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the case of specifications (7) and (8). Such “minimalist” regressions (omitted to save on space
but available upon request) would include many more observations (e.g., about 9, 500 and
2, 500 more observations in columns (1) and (2), respectively), which are otherwise dropped
due to missing trade and macro data. It is without doubt reassuring that reducing the sample
size has minimal effects on the estimated coefficients, especially because the second step of
our empirical strategy cannot be executed without the inclusion of import growth in our
specifications.
Looking at the point estimates of the coefficients of the PTA regressors, they appear
very similar to one another across the first six columns of Table 3. This is not surprising
considering that the median number of targeted 6-digit HS tariff lines per AD measure is 1
(reaching a value of 2 only at the 75th percentile of the distribution), and that there are few
CVDs and China-specific SG measures overall (see also the summary statistics in Table 2). On
the other hand, their point estimates in columns (7)—(8) are quite larger (in absolute value)
than in columns (1)—(6) because the PTA regressors in the last two columns are trade-share
variables rather than count variables. An in-depth discussion of the economic significance
of our results is deferred to Section 5.1, but we can already anticipate that the economic
significance of our estimates is comparable across specifications. As far as the control variables
are concerned, their coefficients are in line with what we expect from previous studies: the
estimated coefficients of import volume and import growth are always positive (although
import growth is mostly statistically insignificant), as is the case for the coefficient of the
bilateral real exchange rate (while the coefficients on importer and exporter GDP growth
rates are never statistically significant).23
The dual purpose of step 1 of our econometric analysis was to establish prima facie evidence
of the effects predicted by our theoretical framework and to dispel concerns about sample
selection bias due to the unavailability of the trade and macro controls. The latter is crucial
as we advance to the second step of our analysis, with the inclusion of import growth in our
specifications being now essential in order to test the empirical predictions in all their detail.
We have to keep in mind, however, that some concerns about sample selection bias remain
23Note that a higher value of the bilateral real exchange rate variable corresponds to an appreciation of the
real exchange rate of the importing country.
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when it comes to the specifications in which the PTA regressors are trade-share variables
(rather than count variables).
The results of the second step of our econometric analysis are reported in Table 4, the
structure of which mirrors that of Table 3. Overall, the negotiation of PTAs is found to
reduce (prospective) members’ extra-PTA AD activity. In particular, the coefficient on CUs
negotiationi,k,t is consistently negative and significant (except in columns (7)—(8); but as we
discussed above, in the case of these specifications, there exist some concerns about sample
selection bias stemming from the loss of observations due to missing trade and macro data).
On the other hand, in terms of statistical significance, the effect of FTA negotiations on AD use
is relatively weaker (and in columns (3)—(4), the estimated coefficient on FTAs negotiationi,k,t
is of the “wrong” sign, albeit statistically insignificant). As far as PTAs in force are concerned,
FTAs have a negative impact on the employment of AD protection independently of the growth
of extra-FTA imports. The coefficient on CUs implementedi,k,t is also negative in all but one
of the estimated specifications, signifying a negative impact of implemented CU agreements
on members’ extra-CU AD activity. Nonetheless, the coefficient on the interaction term with
import growth is always positive and significant. This means that the beneficial effect of CU
establishment on multilateral trade cooperation may be overturned when CU members face
sufficiently large import surges from non-member countries, and the quantification exercise in
the next section investigates whether this possibility could indeed materialize in our sample.
Observe that this last result is consistent with the empirical predictions derived from Tabakis
(2010) and especially with the slope of the bτ c3 curve in Figure 1. As for the other regressors,
their coefficients’ significance is in line with the picture emerging from Table 3.
Notice that these results seem to be at odds with the findings of Prusa and Teh (2010)
who showed that PTAs tend to increase the incidence of AD filings by PTA members against
non-member countries. However, Prusa and Teh (2010) engage in a very different type of
analysis as attested by their very different research design and econometric methodology. In
particular, they rely on a difference-in-difference setup, they look at a broad range of PTAs
and AD users, while they focus on a given window of years before and after the implementation
of each PTA to identify the effects of interest. Interestingly, the aforementioned effect of PTAs
with respect to non-members does not hold when the authors include fixed effects instead of
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random effects in their benchmark specifications (with the full set of controls).24 In addition,
in a major robustness check, the result in question is actually reversed (i.e., PTAs lead to fewer
AD cases by PTA members against not-PTA trade partners) in the case of PTAs that prohibit
intra-PTA AD activity. In fact, it is not necessarily the case that our results are inconsistent
with theirs as the research design of Prusa and Teh (2010) is best suited for uncovering the
effects of PTAs on intra-PTA AD activity.
In conclusion, the estimates in Tables 3 and 4 provide clear support to the theoretical
predictions discussed in Section 2, suggesting that PTAs mostly constitute a building block
towards further multilateral trade liberalization. In particular, the negotiation and the im-
plementation of PTAs both have an effect on the extent of AD use by PTA members against
non-member countries. The more interesting part is that in both cases, the mechanisms
at work (underlain by the market-power and trade-diversion effects of PTAs) induce lower
extra-PTA AD activity, except when members of CUs in force face substantial import growth
from non-member countries. And this differential effect of FTAs and CUs on the multilateral
trading system is very much in line with the evidence provided by Estevadeordal et al. (2008).
5.1 Quantification of Effects
Given the non-linear nature of the estimator, the estimated coefficients do not allow for a
quantifiable interpretation of the impact of our key regressors on AD patterns. To facilitate
such an analysis, we report in Table 5 the predicted counts for our dependent variables based
on the specifications in Table 4 that enable us to test all three predictions of our theoretical
framework. We focus on the specifications including dyad fixed effects, which are the most
demanding when it comes to identifying the ramifications of PTAs for AD activity. The top
panel of Table 5 reports the predicted counts when an importing country is not involved in
either the negotiation or the implementation of any FTA versus when an importing country is
involved in the negotiation or the implementation of an FTA, with the effect of an implemented
FTA being evaluated at different levels of import growth. In the middle panel, we repeat the
same analysis for CUs. The table also includes the percentage change for each scenario as
compared with the benchmark scenario of no PTA under negotiation or in force. And these
24Our results are robust to the use of country-pair random effects.
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percentages provide the easiest way to assess the impact of PTAs on their members’ extra-PTA
AD activity.
Let us begin with our benchmark regression in column (1), in which the dependent variable
is the count of new ADmeasures. Clearly, AD is a relatively rare phenomenon (as already seen
in the summary statistics in Table 2) even when restricting the sample to country pairs with
at least one AD measure during the sample period (i.e., when including dyad fixed effects):
the estimates predict fewer than one AD measure when there is no FTA or CU either under
negotiation or in force (more precisely, 0.426 or 0.362, respectively). The relevant question,
though, is what happens when an importing country is involved in the negotiation or the
implementation of a PTA. The predicted count of AD measures then drops significantly: one
FTA under negotiation reduces the count of new AD measures by 13.4% (significant at the
5% level), while the negotiation of a CU reduces their count by 44.9% (significant at the 1%
level), with the bigger impact of CUs reflecting their larger estimated coefficient in column (2)
of Table 4. When it comes to the effect of implemented PTAs, it becomes critical to consider
the growth of extra-PTA imports, and in what follows, we focus on the cases of low import
growth (i.e., 25th percentile of the distribution) and high import growth (i.e., 75th percentile
of the distribution). In line with the theoretical predictions, the tests at the bottom of the
table show that the effect of implemented FTAs is independent of the growth of members’
extra-FTA imports as the predicted counts for one implemented FTA but at different levels
of import growth are not statistically different from each other (in particular, 0.254 and
0.257 are not statistically different from each other). More specifically, one implemented FTA
reduces members’ extra-FTA AD measures by around 40% as compared with the benchmark
scenario of no FTA under negotiation or in force, no matter the level of growth of extra-
FTA imports. By contrast, import growth does matter when it comes to quantifying the
effects of implemented CU agreements. One implemented CU agreement along with low
growth of imports from non-members leads to fewer AD measures against them relative to the
benchmark scenario (as 0.362 is statistically different from 0.244 at the 1% level). However,
there is a much weaker effect when CU members’ import growth from non-members is high
(more precisely, 0.362 is statistically different from 0.273 only at the 10% level). It is also
the case that one implemented CU leads to statistically different effects depending on import
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growth (as 0.244 and 0.273 are statistically different from each other). Thus, in the case of
high import growth, the building-block effect of CUs is significantly weakened (in terms of
statistical significance), but still, there is no evidence of CUs being stumbling blocks towards
further multilateral trade liberalization.25
Using the count of HS lines subject to new ADmeasures as the dependent variable (column
(2) of Table 5) leads to similar conclusions although the statistical significance of some of the
results is weaker (reflecting the differences in the significance level of the estimated coefficients
in Table 4). In particular, the negotiation of an FTA does not seem to statistically reduce
the number of HS lines targeted by new AD measures, but the implementation of an FTA
does statistically reduce the count of targeted HS lines (independently of import growth) by
about 35% on average. As for CUs, their negotiation reduces their members’ extra-CU AD
activity, while the implementation of a CU exhibits much weaker effects relative to column
(1): insignificant effects under both scenarios of import growth but some indication of a
stumbling-block effect in the high-growth case (more precisely, a 1.6% increase in targeted
HS lines, albeit insignificant). In terms of the magnitude of the predicted counts, the picture
emerging from column (2) is consistent with the one arising from column (1), which is not
surprising if we take into account the fact that the median number of targeted HS lines per AD
measure is 1 and the average number is 2.7. Using the count of AD, CVD, and China-specific
SG measures as the dependent variable (column (3) of Table 5) delivers predicted outcomes
that are very similar to the ones in column (1), which is again to be expected given that there
are overall very few CVDs and China-specific SG measures. Finally, column (4) is based on
the specification in which the key regressors are continuous trade-share variables. In this case,
the predicted counts are calculated by assuming that the shares of imports affected by the
negotiation or the implementation of PTAs are zero when, respectively, PTAs negotiation = 0
or PTAs implemented = 0 (for PTA = {FTA,CU}) and are otherwise equal to the average
value of the relevant regressor (conditional on FTAs or CUs being under negotiation or in
force; e.g., for CUs negotiation = 1, the share of imports affected by the negotiation of
CUs is assumed to be equal to the average value of the regressor CUs negotiation for those
25Similar counts can be computed for more than one PTA under negotiation or in force, or for negoti-
ations and implementations occurring simultaneously. Such predicted counts would not add much to the
interpretation of the results.
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observations for which it is strictly positive). By and large, the results are in line with the
ones in the first column in terms of both magnitude and statistical significance although we
find insignificant effects for implemented CUs under both import-growth scenarios and some
suggestive evidence of a stumbling-block effect in the case of high import growth.
In conclusion, it is not only the estimated coefficients that provide evidence in support of
the theoretical predictions discussed in Section 2. The quantification exercise demonstrates
that the building-block effect of PTAs is sizable but can disappear in the case of implemented
CU agreements and large (enough) surges of extra-CU imports. However, we never find sig-
nificant evidence of CUs producing a stumbling-block effect with our large sample of countries
(whereas Bown and Tovar, 2016, do find evidence of a stumbling-block effect for MERCOSUR
after it started to operate as a CU).26
5.2 Robustness Checks
Tables 3 and 4 already include various robustness checks, demonstrating that our benchmark
results are robust to alternative modeling choices. More specifically, the tables in question
contain various specifications that differ in terms of the dependent variable, the PTA regressors
(namely, trade-share variables versus count variables), and/or the set of included fixed effects
(namely, separate importer and exporter fixed effects versus dyad fixed effects). However,
there are other (conceptual and methodological) aspects to consider in order to confirm the
overall robustness of our conclusions.27
Table 6 reports the results of five different robustness exercises, taking our benchmark
regressions in columns (1)—(2) of Table 4 as our reference point. In the first two columns,
we consider the possibility that the political ideology of individual governments (and changes
thereof) may be driving their more liberal (or more protectionist) trade policies over time
in terms of both PTAs and contingent measures. Clearly, government ideology cannot be
driving the differential impact of FTAs and CUs on their members’ extra-PTA AD activity
as a function of the growth of extra-PTA imports, but some concerns still remain. In order
26Even a scenario with import growth at the 90th percentile of the distribution would not lead to statistically
significant positive percentage changes in members’ extra-CU AD activity as a result of implementing their
CU agreement.
27Robustness checks that are not reported to save on space are available upon request.
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to explicitly control for this possibility, we follow Dutt and Mitra (2005) and include in our
specifications a measure of the ideological orientation of country i’s government, country i’s
capital—labor ratio (in logs), and their interaction term. The theoretical expectation is that
left-wing governments (for which the ideology variable takes a value of 3) should implement
protectionist (liberal) trade policies in capital-abundant (labor-abundant) countries, which is
what we find in columns (1) and (2) of Table 6.28 At the same time, our qualitative results
are unchanged (although the coefficient on FTAs negotiationi,k,t is not significant anymore
in the regression with dyad fixed effects, but the effect of FTA negotiations is not particularly
robust already in Table 4). If anything, we find some evidence of a further dampening effect
of implemented FTAs on their members’ extra-FTA AD activity in the case of high growth of
extra-FTA imports, which is consistent with the bτ c3 curve in Figure 2 being somewhat flatter
than bτ c1.
A related concern is that countries have become overall more open to trade over time,
translating into both an increase in the negotiation and implementation of PTAs and a re-
duction in the use of AD. To control for such a possibility, we replace our importer or dyad
fixed effects with the interaction of such fixed effects and a trend (i.e., we allow for importer
or dyad-specific trend fixed effects). Once again, our qualitative results are robust to the
inclusion of these different fixed effects.
In columns (3) and (4), we re-estimate our benchmark specifications without excluding the
country pairs that are partners to the same PTA in force or are jointly involved in the nego-
tiation of one. At the end of Section 3, we argued that these observations should be excluded
since the focus of the paper lies on examining the effect of PTAs on their members’ extra-PTA
AD activity in order to ascertain whether PTAs constitute a building block or a stumbling
block towards further multilateral trade liberalization. In addition, the theoretical models
by Tabakis (2010, 2015) only give rise to empirical predictions regarding the pattern of AD
activity between PTA members and non-member countries. Still, we can include the observa-
tions so far discarded, remaining agnostic on how the negotiation and the implementation of
PTAs affect their members’ intra-PTA AD activity. The results in Table 6 with these extra
28In comparison with Dutt and Mitra (2005), we do not find a significant effect for the capital—labor ratio.
This is likely due to our inclusion of importer or dyad fixed effects, which Dutt and Mitra (2005) do not include
in their specifications, together with the limited time variation of this regressor.
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observations and dummy variables that control for country pairs that are members of the same
PTA (PTA dummyi,j,t) or are jointly negotiating a PTA (Negotiation dummyi,j,t) show that
the conclusions we reached earlier are overall still valid (although the estimated coefficients
on FTAs negotiationi,k,t and CUs implementedi,k,t are no longer significant). Moreover, our
results are in line with the findings of Prusa and Teh (2010), Ahn and Shin (2011), and Sil-
berberger and Stender (2018) that PTAs have a dampening effect on the AD activity between
their member countries (although the effect is statistically significant only when dyad fixed
effects are included). Instead, the estimated coefficient on Negotiation dummyi,j,t is never
significant.
A yet different way to define the dependent variable is to use the share of bilateral imports
subject to new AD measures. Conceptually, such a variable better captures the extent of AD
protection. However, such an exercise has some serious limitations: i) having to rely on HS
tariff lines to calculate the shares requires starting the sample period only in 1988; and ii) the
dampening effect of AD investigations on targeted imports implies that we should use lagged
values, further reducing our sample size. Notwithstanding these caveats, columns (5) and (6)
of Table 6 show the results when using such import shares (lagged by two years29) as the
dependent variable. As the dependent variable is now an import-share measure, we employ a
fractional probit estimator. Again, the results are robust to this alternative formulation of the
dependent variable (except for the significance of the coefficient on FTAs negotiationi,k,t).
More importantly, this robustness check provides further evidence that our results are not
sensitive to the formulation of the dependent variable used in our estimations.
Except for the specifications in which the PTA regressors are trade-share variables, all the
results are based on PTAs that affect at least 10% of the import volume of the importing
country under consideration. The choice of a threshold of 10% is based on the interest to
consider PTAs that can be expected to have meaningful trade effects that would affect their
members’ gains from multilateral cooperation and from defection from the cooperative path
of play. Still, the 10% threshold is simply assumed, and we need to verify whether the results
are sensitive to our threshold choice. Thus, we re-estimate our specifications using a threshold
29A typical investigation takes, on average, one year to be completed. Thus, a two-year lag seems the
shortest lag that would reduce measurement error in the dependent variable. Ignoring this issue and using
contemporaneous values would not affect the qualitative nature of our results.
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of 5%. In this case, we would expect the results to become weaker in terms of economic
significance and probably less statistically significant as “smaller” PTAs are now included.30
Columns (7) and (8) of Table 6 present the results of such an exercise. Overall, they are
very much in line with our benchmark results although our main regressors have in most cases
smaller estimated coefficients (in absolute value) or somewhat lower levels of significance (while
there is no qualitative change in the coefficients of the control variables). The only notable
difference is that the coefficient on FTAs negotiationi,k,t is, again, not significant.31
The last robustness check reported in Table 6 deals with the functional form of our PTA
regressors. In particular, we use the log of one plus these count variables. This alternative
formulation imposes a non-linear effect of the negotiation and implementation of PTAs on
their members’ extra-PTA AD activity. Once again, the qualitative results are robust to this
alternative formulation of the PTA regressors. Moreover, we uncover a non-linear effect of
PTAs on their members’ extra-PTA AD activity, suggesting that country i’s involvement in
PTAs exhibits diminishing returns in terms of its building-block effect.
We can also experiment with changing the sample of importing countries included in the
analysis. We start by dropping New Zealand as it was a heavy user of AD in the 1980s but
has ever since dramatically decreased its use of AD measures. Excluding New Zealand from
our sample of importers does not affect any of our qualitative conclusions. Considering the
predominant role that India and China have been playing recently when it comes to AD, it is
reassuring that our results are qualitatively unchanged as well when we drop them from the
sample of importing countries. In a final set of robustness checks, we have also tried clustering
standard errors at the importer—year level in consideration of the fact that the number of PTAs
under negotiation and in force varies only by importer and year. Even though the standard
errors increase, the statistical significance of the coefficients of our key regressors is almost
unchanged except for the one on FTAs negotiationi,k,t that loses its significance.32
30With a 5% threshold, 8 more PTAs, of which one is a CU, are used to construct our main regressors (see
Table A1 in the Appendix for details).
31If we were to reduce the threshold even further to 1%, the estimated coefficients of the key regressors would
also be smaller (in absolute value), but the main qualitative results would survive. The only major difference
in comparison with Table 4 would be that the coefficients for the negotiation of FTAs and for implemented
CUs would be insignificant.
32Clustering the standard errors at the importer level would instead lead to few clusters (15 in total),
violating the theoretical assumption that the number of clusters goes to infinity (usually interpreted as a
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6 Conclusions
This paper has empirically explored the implications of PTAs for their member countries’
extra-PTA AD actions (i.e., the AD measures of members against non-member countries). In
so doing, it contributes to the long literature examining whether PTAs are building blocks
or stumbling blocks on the road to further multilateral trade liberalization. To guide the
econometric analysis, we have relied on the theoretical work by Tabakis (2010, 2015). Three
main testable predictions regarding PTAs and AD measures emerge from these papers: (i)
the number of AD measures of members against non-members of an FTA agreement should
decrease both during its negotiation and after its implementation; (ii) the number of AD
measures of members against non-members of a CU agreement should decrease during its
negotiation; and (iii) the number of AD measures of members against non-members of a
CU agreement should increase following its implementation for “high” import volumes from
non-member countries, whereas the reverse should be true for “low” volumes of imports.
To empirically test these predictions, we have first constructed a dataset containing exten-
sive information on the history of formation of a large number of PTAs. This novel dataset
has allowed us to investigate the impact of PTAs on the use of AD protection both during
their negotiation and after their implementation. Using AD data over the period 1980—2015
and different econometric strategies, we have provided clear evidence in support of the afore-
mentioned predictions. PTAs have, in general, a dampening effect on their member countries’
AD activity against the rest of the world (i.e., they produce a building-block effect), except
when members of an implemented CU agreement face large import surges from non-member
countries. In such a case, the building-block effect may disappear, albeit without the (clear)
emergence instead of a stumbling-block effect. These results provide a new piece of evidence
on the (mostly) positive effects of PTAs on multilateral trade cooperation, at least as far as
AD protection is concerned, and the differential effects we have uncovered between FTA and
CU agreements on the multilateral trading system are very much in line with the results of
Estevadeordal et al. (2008). Finally, the findings of our paper are particularly important in
light of the fact that non-tariff barriers have nowadays gained prominence relative to MFN
minimum of 50 in state—year panels; see Cameron and Miller, 2015).
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tariffs, which have dramatically decreased in recent decades because of WTO commitments.
And among non-tariff barriers, AD is the most flexible and widely employed trade policy in-
strument, making it the focus of our analysis–but still, our results are robust to considering
also the use of alternative contingent trade instruments.33
In conclusion, this paper offers yet further evidence that strategic interactions–either
across countries or between a given country’s policies–play a pivotal role in trade policy for-
mulation (see, e.g., Bown and Crowley, 2007; Tabakis and Zanardi, 2017). In particular, we
have demonstrated that a country’s decision to engage in regionalism has important ramifica-
tions for its AD activity vis-à-vis the rest of the world. What is more significant, our analysis
highlights the importance of taking into consideration other policy instruments besides MFN
tariffs in order to get a more comprehensive picture regarding whether PTAs are building
blocks or stumbling blocks towards multilateral trade cooperation. Last, our findings raise
concerns about certain recent developments on the regionalism scene, such as Brexit or the
withdrawal of the United States from the Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement. Of course, it
might be inappropriate to extrapolate our results to the case in which a country withdraws
from either PTA negotiations or an implemented PTA by simply “reversing” the signs of the
reported effects. Nevertheless, by showing the pro-cooperation effects of PTAs at the multi-
lateral level, our analysis does sound the alarm that reversing regional integration may have
broader negative consequences for the world trading system than previously thought.
33Notice that our results are not contradicted by the fact that the use of AD measures around the globe has
been growing over the last decades. This growth is the result of, among other things, an increasing level of
international trade. Actually, our results suggest that we would have seen even more AD measures worldwide
had it not been for the PTAs that have been negotiated and implemented.
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Table 1: Summary statistics on worldwide AD use 
Initiations Initiations per year Measures Measures per year 
USA 1,343 USA 37.31 European Union 643 India 23.25 
European Union 1,056 India 31.83 USA 614 European Union 17.86 
India 764 European Union 29.33 India 558 USA 17.06 
Canada 577 Australia 21.30 Canada 350 Canada 9.72 
Australia 575 Brazil 16.07 Argentina 252 China 9.58 
Brazil 450 Canada 16.03 Brazil 247 Argentina 9.33 
Argentina 380 Argentina 14.07 Turkey 214 Brazil 8.82 
South Africa 306 South Africa 13.30 Australia 204 Turkey 7.93 
Mexico 285 China 12.21 China 182 Australia 7.56 
Turkey 285 Turkey 10.56 South Africa 171 South Africa 7.43 
China 232 Mexico 9.83 Mexico 158 Mexico 5.45 
South Korea 166 Pakistan 6.71 South Korea 93 Vietnam 4.00 
Taiwan 141 Indonesia 6.35 Peru 63 Pakistan 3.64 
Indonesia 127 South Korea 5.53 Indonesia 61 Lithuania 3.50 
Peru 115 Peru 4.79 New Zealand 56 South Korea 3.10 
New Zealand 109 Taiwan 4.55 Egypt 53 Indonesia 3.05 
Colombia 101 Egypt 4.47 Pakistan 51 Egypt 2.79 
Pakistan 94 Colombia 4.04 Thailand 47 Russia 2.73 
Egypt 85 Malaysia 4.00 Colombia 44 Peru 2.63 
Malaysia 84 Sweden 4.00 Malaysia 43 Thailand 2.35 
Israel 68 Vietnam 4.00 Russia 41 Malaysia 2.05 
Thailand 68 Russia 3.53 Taiwan 33 Singapore 2.00 
Russia 53 Latvia 3.50 Ukraine 28 Ukraine 1.87 
Ukraine 37 Lithuania 3.50 Israel 25 Colombia 1.76 
Philippines 29 New Zealand 3.41 Venezuela 16 New Zealand 1.75 
Chile 28 Thailand 3.40 Philippines 13 Venezuela 1.60 
Venezuela 27 Honduras 3.00 Chile 9 Kazakhstan 1.33 
Japan 14 Israel 2.72 Finland 9 Poland 1.29 
Finland 13 Venezuela 2.70 Japan 9 Taiwan 1.06 
Poland 12 Ukraine 2.47 Poland 9 Israel 1.00 
Trinidad Tobago 12 Kazakhstan 2.33 Lithuania 7 Finland 0.75 
Austria 11 Singapore 2.00 Morocco 7 Morocco 0.70 
Costa Rica 11 Poland 1.71 Trinidad Tobago 7 Philippines 0.62 
Morocco 9 Czech Republic 1.50 Jamaica 4 Czech Republic 0.50 
Sweden 8 Nicaragua 1.50 Kazakhstan 4 Dominican Republic 0.50 
Uruguay 8 Philippines 1.38 Vietnam 4 Latvia 0.50 
Kazakhstan 7 Chile 1.33 Costa Rica 3 Nicaragua 0.50 
Latvia 7 Finland 1.08 Austria 2 Chile 0.43 
Lithuania 7 Bulgaria 1.00 Dominican Republic 2 Trinidad Tobago 0.37 
Jamaica 6 GCC 1.00 Ecuador 2 Jamaica 0.36 
Panama 6 Jordan 1.00 Paraguay 2 Japan 0.36 
Ecuador 5 Norway 1.00 Singapore 2 Paraguay 0.33 
Vietnam 4 Slovenia 1.00 Uruguay 2 Austria 0.15 
Czech Republic 3 Morocco 0.90 Czech Republic 1 Ecuador 0.15 
Dominican Republic 3 Austria 0.85 Guatemala 1 Costa Rica 0.15 
Honduras 3 Dominican Republic 0.75 Latvia 1 Uruguay 0.11 
Nicaragua 3 Trinidad Tobago 0.63 Nicaragua 1 Guatemala 0.05 
Guatemala 2 Japan 0.56 Bulgaria 0 Bulgaria 0.00 
Paraguay 2 Costa Rica 0.55 GCC 0 GCC 0.00 
Singapore 2 Jamaica 0.55 Honduras 0 Honduras 0.00 
Bulgaria 1 Panama 0.50 Jordan 0 Jordan 0.00 
GCC 1 Uruguay 0.42 Norway 0 Norway 0.00 
Jordan 1 Ecuador 0.38 Panama 0 Panama 0.00 
Norway 1 Paraguay 0.33 Slovenia 0 Slovenia 0.00 
Slovenia 1 Guatemala 0.11 Sweden 0 Sweden 0.00 
 7,748    4,348   
Notes: Countries in bold and italics are included in the econometric analysis. GCC stands for the six Middle Eastern 
countries of the Gulf Cooperation Council.  
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Table 2: Summary statistics 
Variable Obs. Average St. Dev. Min Max 
Yi,j,t (AD measures) 18,413 0.151 0.669 0 14 
PTAs negotiationi,k,t 18,413 0.364 0.670 0 5 
PTAs implementedi,k,t 18,413 0.762 0.924 0 5 
FTAs negotiationi,k,t 18,413 0.296 0.652 0 5 
CUs negotiationi,k,t 18,413 0.068 0.251 0 1 
FTAs implementedi,k,t 18,413 0.556 0.942 0 5 
CUs implementedi,k,t 18,413 0.206 0.442 0 2 
Import growthi,j,t/t-1 18,413 0.260 0.884 -1 5.754 
ln(Imports)i,j,t-1 18,413 19.320 2.814 1.163 26.869 
ln(Real exchange rate)i,j,t-1 18,413 0.517 3.695 -11.073 10.795 
Importer GDP growthi,t/t-3 18,413 0.120 0.090 -0.155 0.433 
Exporter GDP growthj,t/t-3 18,413 0.115 0.095 -0.436 0.532 
Yi,j,t (HS lines) 16,882 0.335 1.952 0 29 
Yi,j,t (AD, CVD, China-SG measures) 19,185 0.160 0.732 0 19 
PTAs negotiationi,k,t (trade share) 18,413 0.080 0.148 0 0.655 
PTAs implementedi,k,t (trade share) 18,413 0.146 0.211 0 0.766 
FTAs negotiationi,k,t (trade share) 18,413 0.074 0.148 0 0.655 
CUs negotiationi,k,t (trade share) 18,413 0.007 0.031 0 0.226 
FTAs implementedi,k,t (trade share) 18,413 0.129 0.214 0 0.766 
CUs implementedi,k,t (trade share) 18,413 0.017 0.048 0 0.226 
Note: Import growth has been winsorized at the 95th percentile and HS lines at the 99th percentile. 
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Table 3: Step 1 
 Benchmark Alternative dependent variables Alternative key 
regressors 
 Count AD Count HS lines 
of AD measures 
Count AD, CVD, 
China SG 
PTAs measured 
with trade shares 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
PTAs negotiationi,k,t -0.296
*** -0.279*** -0.193** -0.232** -0.232*** -0.213*** -0.650*** -0.673** 
 (0.068) (0.069) (0.085) (0.107) (0.068) (0.071) (0.246) (0.262) 
PTAs implementedi,k,t -0.501
*** -0.484*** -0.223** -0.466*** -0.493*** -0.472*** -2.273*** -2.356*** 
 (0.121) (0.117) (0.105) (0.160) (0.119) (0.115) (0.326) (0.335) 
Import growthi,j,t/t-1 0.083 0.087 0.170
* 0.192* 0.085 0.115 0.067 0.101 
 (0.070) (0.078) (0.102) (0.107) (0.071) (0.077) (0.068) (0.071) 
ln(Imports)i,j,t-1 0.481
*** 0.553*** 0.516*** 0.563*** 0.489*** 0.597*** 0.509*** 0.632*** 
 (0.045) (0.070) (0.060) (0.105) (0.044) (0.072) (0.043) (0.061) 
ln(Real exchange rate)i,j,t-1 0.767
*** 0.762*** 0.390* 0.815*** 0.747*** 0.757*** 0.744*** 0.693*** 
 (0.125) (0.135) (0.208) (0.239) (0.131) (0.139) (0.125) (0.130) 
Importer GDP growthi,t/t-3 0.094 -0.297 0.835 0.405 0.297 -0.224 0.032 -0.462 
 (0.487) (0.500) (0.733) (0.818) (0.507) (0.531) (0.476) (0.488) 
Exporter GDP growthj,t/t-3 0.001 -0.030 -0.367 -0.111 -0.070 0.017 0.053 -0.033 
 (0.378) (0.390) (0.570) (0.646) (0.388) (0.407) (0.389) (0.402) 
Importer FE Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
Exporter FE Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
Importer-Exporter FE  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Year FE  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 18,413 9,176 16,882 7,720 19,185 9,493 18,413 9,176 
Pseudo R2 0.29 0.24 0.18 0.14 0.28 0.23 0.29 0.24 
Note: The table reports the estimated coefficients of negative binomial regressions with standard errors clustered at country-pair level; ***, **, * denote 
significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
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Table 4: Step 2 
 Benchmark Alternative dependent variables Alternative key 
regressors 
 Count AD Count HS lines 
of AD measures 
Count AD, CVD, 
China SG 
PTAs measured 
with trade shares 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
FTAs negotiationi,k,t -0.156
** -0.144* 0.087 0.092 -0.116* -0.098 -0.403* -0.500* 
 (0.071) (0.074) (0.090) (0.119) (0.070) (0.074) (0.235) (0.257) 
CUs negotiationi,k,t -0.592
*** -0.596*** -1.410*** -1.049*** -0.440** -0.464** -3.456 -4.022 
 (0.162) (0.170) (0.252) (0.245) (0.178) (0.191) (2.941) (2.794) 
FTAs implementedi,k,t -0.509
*** -0.504*** -0.169 -0.431** -0.510*** -0.497*** -2.267*** -2.405*** 
 (0.128) (0.125) (0.119) (0.176) (0.126) (0.122) (0.343) (0.351) 
FTAs implementedi,k,t x Import growthi,j,t/t-1 -0.149 -0.058 0.075 0.017 -0.128 -0.056 0.030 0.146 
 (0.170) (0.140) (0.092) (0.170) (0.169) (0.141) (0.873) (0.640) 
CUs implementedi,k,t -0.317
** -0.377** -0.235 -0.135 -0.198 -0.274* 0.982 -0.907 
 (0.149) (0.146) (0.214) (0.254) (0.161) (0.162) (3.492) (3.516) 
CUs implementedi,k,t x Import growthi,j,t/t-1 0.373
*** 0.386*** 0.402** 0.541*** 0.390*** 0.385*** 3.922*** 5.652*** 
 (0.113) (0.115) (0.168) (0.194) (0.113) (0.115) (0.709) (1.124) 
Import growthi,j,t/t-1 0.023 0.015 0.099 0.059 0.018 0.040 -0.039 -0.035 
 (0.089) (0.092) (0.112) (0.107) (0.088) (0.092) (0.084) (0.088) 
ln(Imports)i,j,t-1 0.474
*** 0.536*** 0.517*** 0.519*** 0.481*** 0.579*** 0.499*** 0.610*** 
 (0.043) (0.067) (0.059) (0.100) (0.043) (0.071) (0.042) (0.059) 
ln(Real exchange rate)i,j,t-1 0.781
*** 0.776*** 0.402** 0.822*** 0.756*** 0.764*** 0.755*** 0.711*** 
 (0.128) (0.139) (0.201) (0.237) (0.133) (0.141) (0.127) (0.137) 
Importer GDP growthi,t/t-3 0.226 -0.218 1.139 0.882 0.495 -0.072 0.085 -0.489 
 (0.516) (0.537) (0.725) (0.840) (0.540) (0.580) (0.492) (0.511) 
Exporter GDP growthj,t/t-3 -0.114 -0.143 -0.537 -0.331 -0.178 -0.091 -0.084 -0.097 
 (0.386) (0.394) (0.558) (0.652) (0.396) (0.411) (0.410) (0.425) 
Importer FE Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
Exporter FE Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
Importer-Exporter FE  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Year FE  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 18,413 9,176 16,882 7,720 19,185 9,493 18,413 9,176 
Pseudo R2 0.29 0.24 0.19 0.14 0.28 0.23 0.29 0.24 
Note: The table reports the estimated coefficients of negative binomial regressions with standard errors clustered at country-pair level; ***, **, * denote significance 
at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.
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Table 5: Quantification exercise 
 Count AD Count HS 









 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
(1) C(FTAs negotiation=0, FTAs implemented=0 0.426*** 1.132*** 0.463*** 0.448*** 
(2) C(FTAs negotiation=1, FTAs implemented=0) 0.369*** 1.241*** 0.420*** 0.414*** 
Percentage change compared with (1) -13.437%** 9.605% -9.353% -7.702%** 
(3) C(FTAs negotiation=0, FTAs implemented=1, imp. growth=25th pct) 0.254*** 0.716*** 0.277*** 0.234*** 
Percentage change compared with (1) -40.432%*** -36.808%*** -40.205%*** -47.684%*** 
(4) C(FTAs negotiation=0, FTAs implemented=1, imp. growth=75th pct) 0.257*** 0.759*** 0.282*** 0.240*** 
Percentage change compared with (1) -39.731%*** -33.014%*** -39.077%*** -46.387%*** 
(5) C(CUs negotiation=0, CUs implemented=0) 0.362*** 0.899*** 0.369*** 0.312*** 
(6) C(CUs negotiation=1, CUs implemented=0) 0.199*** 0.315*** 0.232*** 0.245*** 
Percentage change compared with (7) -44.892%*** -64.967%*** -37.117%*** -21.589% 
(7) C(CUs negotiation=0, CUs implemented=1, imp. growth=25th pct) 0.244*** 0.758*** 0.275*** 0.286*** 
Percentage change compared with (7) -32.481%*** -15.664% -25.479%** -8.310% 
(8) C(CUs negotiation=0, CUs implemented=1, imp. growth=75th pct) 0.273*** 0.913*** 0.310*** 0.325*** 
Percentage change compared with (7) -24.362%** 1.585% -15.918% 4.103% 
Importer-Exporter FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Test (1) = (2), z-statistics 1.85* -0.77 1.28 1.81* 
Test (1) = (3), z-statistics 3.55*** 2.03** 3.52*** 5.49*** 
Test (1) = (4), z-statistics 3.37*** 1.81* 3.32*** 5.45*** 
Test (3) = (4), z-statistics -0.27 -0.86 -0.43 -0.49 
Test (5) = (6), z-statistics 3.90*** 4.48*** 2.69*** 1.46 
Test (5) = (7), z-statistics 2.68*** 0.68 1.85* 0.32 
Test (5) = (8), z-statistics 1.93* -0.06 1.09 -0.15 
Test (7) = (8), z-statistics -3.15*** -2.54** -3.24*** -3.48*** 
Observations 9,176 7,720 9,493 9,176 
Notes: The table reports average predicted counts for columns (2), (4), (6) and (8) of Table 4 conditioning on the variables in the 
C(•) function (in Table 5) taking on the specified values while the other variables are taking their actual values. In column (4), the 
values for negotiation and implemented equal to 1 are given by the mean of the relevant regressor (conditional on FTAs or CUs 
being under negotiation or in force).  ***, **, * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
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Table 6: Robustness checks 
 Ideology All dyads Trade share as ‘y’ 5% threshold Log versions 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
FTAs negotiationi,k,t -0.126
* -0.113 0.052 0.017 0.116 0.128 -0.063 -0.058 -0.192* -0.176 
 (0.076) (0.080) (0.054) (0.054) (0.076) (0.095) (0.062) (0.064) (0.108) (0.115) 
CUs negotiationi,k,t -0.529*** -0.549*** -0.410*** -0.554*** -0.520*** -0.515*** -0.569*** -0.544*** -0.763*** -0.770*** 
 (0.162) (0.170) (0.140) (0.159) (0.141) (0.149) (0.156) (0.154) (0.238) (0.249) 
FTAs implementedi,k,t -0.699*** -0.681*** -0.127* -0.166** -0.243*** -0.311*** -0.495*** -0.504*** -0.841*** -0.852*** 
 (0.114) (0.116) (0.073) (0.081) (0.083) (0.094) (0.123) (0.123) (0.193) (0.195) 
FTAs implementedi,k,t x Import growthi,j,t/t-1 -0.357** -0.255* -0.149 -0.069 0.065 0.142 0.085 0.095 -0.271 -0.123 
 (0.169) (0.151) (0.114) (0.098) (0.100) (0.164) (0.178) (0.133) (0.258) (0.210) 
CUs implementedi,k,t -0.410*** -0.449*** 0.054 -0.171 -0.476*** -0.540*** -0.375** -0.421*** -0.321 -0.441* 
 (0.135) (0.136) (0.122) (0.121) (0.147) (0.160) (0.150) (0.150) (0.252) (0.254) 
CUs implementedi,k,t x Import growthi,j,t/t-1 0.264** 0.257* 0.311*** 0.288** 0.266** 0.400*** 0.323** 0.272** 0.543*** 0.569*** 
 (0.129) (0.131) (0.108) (0.114) (0.118) (0.154) (0.140) (0.139) (0.168) (0.174) 
Import growthi,j,t/t-1 0.031 0.031 0.095 0.085 -0.221** -0.334** -0.018 -0.007 0.024 0.018 
 (0.091) (0.093) (0.080) (0.082) (0.110) (0.156) (0.109) (0.106) (0.091) (0.094) 
ln(Imports)i,j,t-1 0.479*** 0.564*** 0.557*** 0.571*** 0.027 -0.044 0.488*** 0.566*** 0.479*** 0.547*** 
 (0.044) (0.070) (0.037) (0.063) (0.024) (0.049) (0.042) (0.061) (0.043) (0.066) 
ln(Real exchange rate)i,j,t-1 0.796*** 0.794*** 0.800*** 0.752*** 0.229*** 0.336*** 0.787*** 0.767*** 0.768*** 0.756*** 
 (0.135) (0.146) (0.122) (0.128) (0.085) (0.094) (0.128) (0.136) (0.129) (0.139) 
Importer GDP growthi,t/t-3 0.280 -0.219 -0.091 -0.327 -0.244 -0.132 0.100 -0.271 0.298 -0.152 
 (0.576) (0.596) (0.461) (0.478) (0.512) (0.537) (0.524) (0.539) (0.515) (0.535) 
Exporter GDP growthj,t/t-3 -0.091 -0.127 -0.054 0.039 -0.187 -0.229 -0.062 -0.077 -0.129 -0.175 
 (0.385) (0.387) (0.362) (0.364) (0.516) (0.591) (0.381) (0.387) (0.389) (0.398) 
Ideologyi,t -0.773*** -0.823***         
 (0.143) (0.148)         
ln(K/L)i,t -0.002 -0.164         
 (0.200) (0.214)         
Ideologyi,t x ln(K/L)i,t 0.204*** 0.209***         
 (0.031) (0.032)         
Negotiation dummyi,j,t   -0.001 0.054       
   (0.109) (0.125)       
PTA dummyi,j,t   -0.166 -0.307**       
   (0.133) (0.135)       
Importer FE Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
Exporter FE Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
Importer-Exporter FE  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Year FE  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 17,034 8,819 23,336 11,886 15,747 7,503 18,413 9,176 18,413 9,176 
Pseudo R2 0.30 0.25 0.29 0.23 0.17 0.22 0.29 0.24 0.29 0.24 
Note: The table reports the estimated coefficients of negative binomial regressions (fractional probit in columns 5-6) with standard errors clustered at country-pair level; ***, **, * 
denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
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Table A1: PTAs included in the analysis 
PTA name Importing countries 







Indonesia FTA no 
ASEAN-Australia-New Zealand Australia, New Zealand, Indonesia FTA no 
ASEAN-China China, Indonesia FTA no 
ASEAN-India India FTA no 
ASEAN-India Indonesia FTA no 
ASEAN-Japan Indonesia FTA no 
ASEAN-South Korea South Korea FTA no 
ASEAN-South Korea Indonesia FTA no 
Australia-China Australia FTA no 
China-New Zealand New Zealand FTA no 
China-South Korea China FTA no 
China-South Korea South Korea FTA no 
CUSFTA Canada, USA FTA no 
EU12 enlargement EU CU no 
EU15 enlargement EU CU no 
EU25 enlargement EU CU no 
EU-Canada Canada FTA yes 
EU-Columbia-Peru-Ecuador Peru FTA no 
EU-India India FTA yes 
EU-Indonesia Indonesia FTA yes 
EU-Mexico Mexico FTA no 
EU-SADC EPA South Africa FTA yes 
EU-South Africa South Africa FTA no 
EU-South Korea South Korea FTA no 
EU-Turkey Turkey CU no 
Japan-Australia Australia FTA no 
Japan-Indonesia Indonesia FTA no 
Japan-South Korea South Korea FTA yes 
MERCOSUR Argentina, Brazil CU no 
NAFTA Canada, Mexico, USA FTA no 
Peru-China Peru FTA no 
South Korea-US South Korea FTA no 
TTIP EU, USA FTA yes 
US-Australia Australia FTA no 
US-Peru Peru FTA no 
Notes: Agreements are classified as still under negotiation based on their status at the end of 2015. Agreements in 
italics are included when using the 5% threshold. 
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Table A2: Sample period for included importing countries 
Country First year Last year 
Argentina 1989 2015 
Australia 1989 2015 
Brazil 1988 2015 
Canada 1980 2015 
China 1997 2015 
European Union 1980 2015 
India 1992 2015 
Indonesia 1996 2015 
Mexico 1987 2015 
New Zealand 1982 2015 
Peru 1992 2015 
South Africa 1992 2015 
South Korea 1986 2015 
Turkey 1989 2015 
USA 1980 2015 
 
